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Textbook discussions of discrete choice modelling focus on binomial and 
multinomial choice models in which agents select a single response. We 
consider the situation of non-exclusive multinomial choice. The widely used 
Marginal Logit Model imposes independence and has other disadvantages. 
We propose two models which account for non-exclusive and dependent 
multiple responses and require at least one response. In the first and simpler 
specification, the Poisson-multinomial, households first choose the number 
of responses to a specific shock, and then the specific choices are identified 
to maximize household utility conditional on the former choice. The second 
specification,  the  threshold-multinomial,  generalizes  the  standard 
multinomial logit model by supposing that agents will choose more than one 
response if the utility they derive from other choices is “close” to that of the 
utility-maximizing  choice.  We  apply  these  two  approaches  to  reported 
responses  of  rural  Indonesian  rural  households  to  demographic  and 
economic shocks. 
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1.  Introduction 
Textbook  discussions  of  discrete  choice  modelling  focus  on  binomial  and  multinomial  choice 
models  in  which  agents  select  a  single  response.  We  consider  the  situation  of  non-exclusive 
multinomial choice. One possibility is to adopt the so-called Marginal Logit Model (MLM) which 
posits an independent binomial model for each choice (Agresti and Liu, 1999). The MLM has two 
disadvantages: it allows the possibility of no response which may not be realistic, and it supposes 
that  response  decisions  are  independent.  We  propose  two  alternative  models  which  allow  for 
interdependence and require at least one response. 
 
We  apply  these  models  to  the  responses  of  Indonesian  rural  households  to  demographic  and 
economic shocks. The structure of the interviews from which we take our data requires a shock to 
have a response. While the majority of shocks elicit only a single response, some shock instances 
elicit multiple responses. It appears that multiple responses are to a large extent associated with 
particular interviewers employed in the survey. 
 
In a multinomial context, the standard random utility model supposes that the agent will pick the 
choice which maximizes his utility. Depending on the stochastic specification, one obtains either 
the multinomial logit or the multinomial probit model. When the number of potential responses 
exceeds  three,  multinomial  probit  becomes  computationally  infeasible  and,  absent  any  natural 
ordering  of  choices,  one  is  obliged  to  use  multinomial  logit  despite  the  well-known  irrelevant 
alternatives problem. This is the situation from which we start.  
 
We develop two models. In the first and simpler specification, choices are modelled as sequential: a 
household first chooses the number of responses to a specific shock, and then the specific choices 
are identified to maximize household utility conditional on the former choice. In this case, we may 
think of the interviewer as selecting the number of responses and the interviewee identifying the 
particular  responses.  In  the  second  specification,  we  generalize  the  standard  multinomial  logit 
model by supposing that agents will choose more than one response if the utility they derive from 
other choices is “close” to that of the utility-maximizing choice. In effect, this supposes selection of 
a utility maximizing band, which will contain at least one choice but may contain more than one. 
This specification makes choice of the number of responses joint with choice of the particular 
responses. 
 
   2 
2.  Non-exclusive multinomial choice 
The standard multiple choice model is posed in terms of maximization of a random utility function. 
Our  application  is  to  adjustment  to  shocks.  Any  such  adjustment  imposes  costs.  We  adapt  the 
random utility framework by modelling choice as resulting from minimization of a random cost 
function.  We  suppose  that  households  may  experience  one  of  a  number  S    ³  1  of  shocks  and 
respond to each shock experienced from a choice set comprising M ³ 2 of adjustment modes. (In 
our data, all responses are available for all shock types). This gives a total of MS shock-response 
pairs. 
 
Write chms for the cost of adjustment mode m to shock s for household h. These costs will depend on 
a  vector  xh  of  household  characteristics.  There  are  H  households  in  the  sample.  Following  the 
random utility approach, we assume that adjustment costs have a deterministic and a stochastic 
component and write 
  hms hms hms f c e + =                         (1) 
The household chooses its adjustment mode(s) to minimize adjustment costs. Satisfaction of the 
budget constraint forces at least one response. Standard microeconomic theory suggests that it will 
be optimal for the household to make multiple responses, such that marginal adjustment cost is 
equalized across modes. Either discreteness (for example, in taking an extra job) or fixed costs may 
result in zero adjustment in one or more modes.  
 
The Marginal Logit Model 
We start with the case of a single response and then move on to multiple responses. Write  1 hms r = if 
household  h  chooses  response  {1,2,..., } m M Î   in  response  to  a  shock  of  type  s.  Define 
( ) Pr 1| hms hms h p r x = =  as the probability that response m is the cost-minimizing response to shock s. 
For simplicity, focus on the first response ph1s.  Henceforth, we omit the shock subscript s where 
this does not result in ambiguity. Ignoring the possibility of ties 
  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 Pr 1 Pr , 2,.., | h h h hm h p r c c m M x = = = < =   (2) 
and similarly for the remaining M-1 choices. Following Domenich and McFadden (1975) assume 
that the stochastic cost components ehm follows an extreme value (Gnedenko) distribution. Then 
hm hm hm c f = +e   also  has  the  same  distribution  as  does  the  cost  of  the  minimizing  choice 
*
{1,.., } min h m M hm c c Î = . Hence the probabilities phm are logistic:    3 



















  (3) 
where  ( ) 1,2,..,
hm f
hm a e m M
- = = . (The minus signs reflect the fact that we are minimizing costs 
rather than maximizing utilities as in the standard random utility model). 
 
In many circumstances it will be possible for agents to have multiple responses. The most simple 















    (4) 
This is the Marginal Logit Model of Agresti and Liu (1999) – see also Loughin and Scherer (1998) 
and Agresti (2003). Treating choices as independent implies that the probability of choosing any 
one alternative does not affect the probability of choosing the others.  
 
In  principle,  this  independence  across  alternatives  allows  us  to  estimate  each  probability 
relationship separately. However, this approach has two disadvantages: it allows the possibility of a 
null  response  (not  possible  in  our  dataset)  and  it  does  not  take  into  account  possible 
interdependence across choices.
1 In contexts, such as that in which we find ourselves, in which most 
agents  choose  a  single  approach,  the  independence  assumption  appears  implausible.  In  other 
contexts in which multiple choice is the norm and null responses are possible, the MLM may be 
completely satisfactory. 
 
In contexts in which choices appear dependent, it may be more appropriate to develop a version of 
the multinomial model modified to allow multiple response. We develop two models that account 
for non-exclusive and dependent multiple responses: a Poisson model and a threshold model that 
generalizes the random utility approach. 
 
The Poisson model supposes that the household makes a sequential decision, first choosing the 
number  ( ) # h h m = W  of responses to a shock, and then identifying the best (i.e. cost-minimizing) mh 
response, i.e. the set  h W  conditional on this choice mh. By contrast, the threshold model supposes 
that the number mh of responses is an outcome of the response identification decision.  
 
                                                 
1 Agresti and Liu (1999, p.943) note the absence of null responses in the Kansas livestock farmer dataset 
analyzed by Loughin and Scherer (1998).   4 
Dependent Multiple Responses: A Poisson-Multinomial Model
2 
The survey design obliges households to identify at least one response to any shock. Hence the 
number mh of responses is a non-zero integer:  { } 1,2,.., h m M Î . If  1 h m -  follows a Poisson process 
with mean  ( ) h h x m =m , where the unit displacement reflects the impossibility of a null response, we 
may write 
  ( )















  (5) 
Consider first the case in which mh = 1 and response j is selected. In the logit framework 


















W = = = = =
∑ ∑
  (6) 
Combining equations (5) and (6) 












W = = =
∑




-m q = .  
 
Turning to the case in which mh = 2 with responses i and  j selected, we need to consider the 
probability that j is the overall cost minimizing choice and that i is the next best, and the converse 
situation in which i is the overall cost minimizing choice and that j is the next best. Following the 
derivation shown in Appendix B, the probability of choosing responses i and j given that mh = 2 is 
given by: 
  { } ( )
1 1 1
1 1
Pr , | .
hi hj h h
h h hij M M M
hm hm hj hm hi
m m m
a a
i j x p
a a a a a
= = =
 
  q m   W = = = +
     
- -      
      ∑ ∑ ∑
  (8) 
The argument is similar in the case that three responses are selected - see Appendix B. 
 
 
                                                 
2 There exists a literature on so-called multinomial-Poisson models in which individuals make  multiple 
responses  across  a  range  of  response  modes.  An  example  is  transport  mode  frequencies  for  different 
transport modes in which households may use different modes on different occasions – see Terza and Wilson 
(1990). These models replace the multinomial response probabilities with Poisson frequencies. Our models 
differ with the polar opposite case in which responses remain categorical but the number of responses is 
variable and is modeled as Poisson.   5 
Dependent Multiple Responses: A Threshold Model 
As  previously,  let  Wh  be  the  set  of  responses  made  by  household  h  to  a  particular  shock.  We 
generalize  the  random  utility  framework  by  introducing  a  household-specific  threshold 
( ) 0 h h t t x = ³ . Within this framework, the household may choose the first response to shock s either 
because this is the cost-minimizing choice or because one of the other choices is cost-minimizing 
but the cost of the first choice is sufficiently close.  
First consider households which make a single response. Define 
  { } ( ) 1 Pr 1 h h p = W =  
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p c c t m M
f f t m M
f f t m M
= £ - =
= +e £ +e - =
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      (9) 
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= =
+ +l ∑ ∑
        (10) 
where  1
h t
h e l = ³ .  
 
Now consider a household which responds using two modes, say 1 and 2:  
{ } ( ) 12 Pr 1,2 h h p = W =  
We need to consider two cases, that in which choice mode 1 is cost minimizing while mode 2 is 
sufficiently close to be also chosen, and the converse case in which 2 is cost minimizing and 1 is 
also chosen. Using the same notation 
( )
( )
12 1 2 1 1
2 1 2 2
Pr & , 3,...,
Pr & , 3,...,
h h h h h h hm h
h h h h h hm h
p c c c t c c t m M
c c c t c c t m M
= < £ + £ - =
+ £ £ + £ - =
      (11) 
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a a
p
a a a a a a a
= ¹ = ¹ ÏW
 
 
l -   = +        
 +l  +l + +l      
         
∑ ∑ ∑
  (12)   6 
See Appendix B for derivation of this result and also for the case in which three responses are 
selected.  
 
3.  Shocks, household responses and their consequences  
The analysis of the uncertainty affecting households, and their responses to this uncertainty, is a key 
issue in developing countries, where poor people are exposed to risks that affect household living 
conditions (Morduch, 1994; Dercon, 2005). Shocks, defined as large adverse movements in their 
incomes or consumption requirements, can have a major impact on the possibility of the household 
escaping poverty or may induce a non-poor household to enter poverty. Uncertainty is therefore 
central to our understanding of vulnerability. World Bank (2000) notes the importance of policies 
that help poor people to manage the risks they face. A growing theoretical and empirical literature 
focuses on the analysis of income variability and on the ability of households to overcome income 
risks. A related literature looks at vulnerability.  
 
Poor  people  have  developed  mechanisms  to  deal  with  hardships.  Often  these  involve  informal 
insurance  arrangements  between  individuals  and  entire  communities.  Although  these  strategies 
offer some cushion against shocks , they are not always sufficient with the consequence that shocks 
may  push  households  into  poverty  or  exacerbate  their  existing  poverty  status.  Even  when 
households are able to deal with risk, the risk-management strategies they adopt may have negative 
consequences. They may, for example, destroy or reduce the physical, financial, human or social 
capital of the household (Dercon, 2005), in this way increasing the risk of entering poverty when 
faced with future . Transient shocks can give rise to permanent effects when children are required to 
drop out of school or, are required to work while remaining in school, (de Janvry et al., 2006). In 
this  sense,  short  run  income  maintenance  may  be  at  the  expense  of  longer-term  well-being. 
Furthermore,  fear  of  risk  can  force  poor  households  to  choose  safe  but  less  profitable  choices 
(Morduch, 1990; Alderman and Paxson, 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993); with the result that 
risk-coping  strategies  may  divert  resources  away  from  directly  productive  activities  and  may 
prevent  households  from  exploiting  comparative  advantage.  Hence,  if  we  are  to  design  an 
appropriate income protection framework, it is important to understand how households cope with 
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4.  Data 
The data used for this study are from the 1993 Indonesia Family Life Survey data (IFLS1). 7224 
households were interviewed over a wide range of issues. Our focus is on the section of the survey 
relating to demographic and economic shocks. Respondents were asked whether their household 
had experienced an economic shock in the past five years, the type of the shock, when it happened 
(year and month), what measures were taken and the costs of overcoming the shocks.  
 
Six types of shock are analyzed in the IFLS dataset:  
i)  death of a household member, 
ii)  sickness of a household member  
iii) crop loss,  
iv) household or business loss due to a disaster,  
v)  unemployment of a household member,  
vi) fall in the price of a crop.  
We distinguish between demographic and economic shocks – demographic shocks are death and 
sickness, while economic shocks are the remaining four categories.  The nature of the shock is 
important because it has implications for the ability to cope with its consequences (see Dercon, 
2002),  and  influences  the  response  adopted.  A  related  distinction  is  between  idiosyncratic  and 
common shocks which is correlated with but not implied by the demographic-economic distinction. 
 
Turning to the measures adopted to cope with the shocks, the survey allowed us to distinguish six 
possible responses:  
i)  extra job,  
ii)  loan, (including a loan from families or friends),  
iii) asset sale (sale of next harvest, food,  cattle or poultry, jewellery or other assets),  
iv) family assistance,  
v)  use of savings,  
vi) cut expenditures.  




                                                 
3 The survey also includes an explicit question on the costs associated with each shock. We do not use the 
answers to this question in this paper for two reasons. First, response is partial. Second, it is unclear whether 
this variable measures the pre- or post-response (i.e. gross or net) costs associated with shocks. (The variable 
we have defined in equation (1) is on a gross basis).   8 
The responses identified in the survey are all ex-post risk-coping strategies.
4 They can be divided 
into  two  categories:  risk-sharing  strategies  that  smooth  consumption  across  households,  and 
intertemporally smoothing strategies, that smooth consumption over time. Risk sharing responses 
involve either formal institutions, such as formal credit transactions, or informal mechanisms (e.g. 
transfers between families or friends). Instead, households smooth consumption intertemporally by 
saving and borrowing, or by accumulating and selling non-financial assets (Alderman and Paxson, 
1992; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Dercon, 2002). 
 
We  include  only  those  households  in  our  dataset  that  supplied  a  complete  set  of  income  and 
demographic data. After dropping income outliers (1.3% of the total sample), and considering only 
rural households, the sample reduces to 3246 households. 1116 households (34.4% of the total 
sample) experienced at least one shock in the five years reporting period, 697 of them (21,5% of the 
total sample) experienced at least one shock in 1992-93.  Table 1 reports the number of households 
that experienced each type of shock over the five years 1989-93 and the two years 1992-93.  
Table 1 
Reported Household Shock Experience 
1989-93  1992-93  Type of shock 
# rural households   per cent  # rural households   per cent 
Death  254  7.8%  111  3.5% 
Sickness  325  10.0%  169  5.2% 
Crop loss  544  16.8%  340  10.5% 
Business loss  60  1.8%  35  1.0% 
Unemployment  54  1.7%  28  0.9% 
Price falls  231  7.0%  147  4.5% 
The table reports the number of households, and the percentage of all households 
sampled, reporting shocks of each type over the five year period 1989-93 and the 
two year sub-period 1992-93 used in the subsequent analysis. 
 
The most frequent shocks are sickness and crop loss. Business loss and unemployment affect only a 
few households. In view of the low incidence of these shocks in our data, we aggregate these into a 
single category reducing the number M of shock types to five for the purposes of econometric 
analysis. 
  
Table 2 shows the percentage of multiple responses for each shock. The majority of households 
report a single response. This is consistent with the view either that responses are interdependent - 
the fact of having chosen (or reported) one response mode reduces the probability of choosing (or 
                                                 
4 Ex ante risk-management strategies include diversification across crops, the use of a variety of production 
techniques, etc.   9 




Percentage of Multiple Responses Reported 
  1989-93  1992-93 
Death  19.7%  22.5% 
Sickness  19.7%  16.6% 
Crop loss  18.6%  17.4% 
Business loss due to a disaster  15.0%  8.6% 
Unemployment  24.0%  21.5% 
Price falls  15.0%  17.7% 
The table reports the percentage of those households which experienced each type of 
shock who reported multiple responses over the five year period 1989-93 and the two 
year sub-period 1992-93 used in the subsequent analysis. 
 
Table 3 shows the percentage of households that responded in each manner for each shock. These 
statistics suggest that household responses differ between demographic shocks (death, illness) and 
economic  shocks  (crop  loss,  business  loss  or  unemployment,  price  falls).  The  data  suggest  an 
important role for family and community assistance in the case of demographic shocks, while this 
measure appears relatively less important as a response to crop loss and price falls.  
.  
Table 3 
Shock Responses by Household (1992-93) 
  Death  Sickness  Crop loss  Business loss or 
unemployment  Price falls 
Extra job  13.5%  7.7%  47.9%  34.4%  42.2% 
Take loan  28.8%  36.0%  18.8%  29.5%  17.0% 
Sell assets  27.0%  27.2%  15.6%  23.0%  17.7% 
Family assistance  36.0%  21.9%  7.0%  13.0%  4.0% 
Use savings  15.3%  17.7%  5.0%  3.3%  4.0% 
Cut down on household expenses  4.5%  4.7%  22.6%  14.7%  32.6% 
The table summarizes the percentages of those households which experienced each type of shock 
who  identify  each  response  mode  the  two  year  sub-period  1992-93  used  in  the  subsequent 
analysis. Because of multiple responses, percentages sum to more than 100%. 
 
Cameron  and  Worswick  (2003)  have  argued  that  labour  supply  responses  help  Indonesian 
households to smooth consumption in the face of a crop loss. This response appears particularly 
important for economic shocks. It is also apparent that economic shocks are more likely to lead to a 
decline in consumption than are demographic shocks. 
   10 
We turn now to the explanatory variables we will use in the econometric model. Microeconomic 
theory indicates that two variables are potentially important in explaining shock responses. The first 
is the extent to which shocks are common across households. Standard discussions indicate that 
informal insurance mechanisms are better able to cope with idiosyncratic shocks than with common 
shocks. The dataset allows us to identify the village in which a household is resident. We define a 
commonality  variable  as  the  weighted  percentage  of  households  (other  than  the  household  in 
question) that experienced the same shock in the same village. Let hs Z  be the percentage of families 
that experience shock s in the village in which household h is resident. The commonality variable, 











, where  h n  is 
the number of households surveyed in the village and  hs d  is a dummy variable equals to one if the 
household h has experienced shock. The modification is important because the unmodified variable 
hs Z   will  not  be  independent  of  hs d   in  villages  in  which  there  is  a  small  number  of  reporting 
households.  
 
The second potentially important variable is household permanent income. Certain shock responses 
are more easily available to rich households than to poor households. We should therefore expect 
that the probability of choosing a specific mode will be affected by the household’s wealth. For 
example, poor people are less able to save and accumulate assets, and they have restricted access to 
credit because of lack of collaterals. As suggested in World Bank (2000), poor health and bad 
nutrition limit the possibility to work more or send more household members to work. The poor 
households are thus more vulnerable and have limited means to deal with a crisis. We measure 
household  wealth  through  estimated  permanent  income.  Construction  of  the  permanent  income 
variable is discussed in Appendix A. 
 
In addition to these economic variables, the survey design (in particular, incomplete instructions) 
may result that the identity of the interviewer plays a role in determining the number of responses 
chosen by the household. Since we are able to identify the interviewer for each respondent, we 
relate  the  number  of  responses  chosen  by  each  household  to  the  average  number  of  responses 
elicited by the same interviewer, excluding responses given by the household in question. 
 
5.  The empirical model 
We define the cost associated with a certain measure and a certain shock as a random cost with a 
stochastic and a deterministic component – see section 2. We assume that households choose the   11 
response mode that minimizes this adjustment cost or, in the case of multiple responses, that has a 
cost  sufficiently  close  to  the  best  choice.  To  implement  the  models  we  need  to  specify  the 
deterministic cost component ( hms f  in equation (1)), the household specific threshold ( hs t ), and the 
Poisson parameter  hs m . Hence the empirical strategy has two components: the first is the definition 
and estimation of the deterministic cost, and the second involves the adjustment of the multinomial 
model to account for non-exclusivity of responses. 
 
The three variables we use vary across households and shocks but not across response modes. This 
implies that the response probabilities to a particular shock all depend on the same three variables. 
Alternative models imply different nonlinear mappings of these variables into the unit interval. In 
principles, each such mapping might depend on a large number of parameters, but with a limited 
number of observations it is difficult to identify all parameters. (In particular, a number of shock-
response  pairs  are  poorly  represented  in  the  data).  We  impose  structure  on  these  mappings  by 
jointly estimating the response probabilities across shocks and by imposing a degree of response 
homogeneity. 
 
We adopt a linear specification for the deterministic cost component: 
 
P
hms ms m hs ms h f z y = k + g +a     (13) 
hs z  is the variable defined in section 4 that captures the commonality of the shock in each village, 
and 
P
h y  is the estimated household permanent income. We impose homogeneity on the intercepts 
for the demographic and economic shocks respectively 










k = k =
k = k =
  (14) 
In the Poisson model we posit  
  exp( ) hs s s hs v m = m +b           (15) 
where vhs is the average number of responses elicited by household h’s interviewer to shock type s. 
Similarly, for the threshold model we suppose that the threshold, beneath which response costs are 
regarded  as  indistinguishable,  is  influenced  by  the  identity  of  the  interviewer,  motivating  the 
specification 
  exp( ) hs s s hs t v = t +j ,           (16) 
where s ={d,e} (demographic and economic)  
   12 
The estimated cost functions are latent and therefore have an arbitrary zero. This implies that we 
need to normalize the parameters. We do this by setting the adjustment costs ch1s to zero for each 
shock type s. The implied parameter restrictions are  
( ) 1 1 1 0 1,.., s s s S k = g = a = =         (17) 
 
To evaluate the importance of modelling multiple responses as interdependent, we compare the 
results obtained from these models with those from the MLM which treats each response as an 
independent  decision.  Both  the  threshold  and  the  Poisson-multinomial models  use  the  identical 
adjustment costs expression (13) but substitutes the MLM probability (4) for the threshold and the 
Poisson probabilities. Note that parameter normalization is not required in the MLM case – the 
alternative to responding in a particular manner is not making that response. The implication is that 
it is only the intra-response mode differences that are comparable across the two models. To obtain 
comparability between the MLM, the threshold and Poisson probabilities, we re-normalize equation 
(13) for the MLM model, as  
  1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( )
P
hms s ms m hs s ms h s hs f k g z a y v = + k + + g + +a +b   (18) 
in conjunction with the restrictions given by equations (17). 
 
6.  Results 
We have estimated the parameters of the deterministic component of the cost function (13) using 
the MLM, the Poisson-multinomial models and the threshold multinomial. Results are reported in 
Table 4 (see end of paper). 
·  Looking first at the MLM specification, the greater the shock commonality, the lower is the cost 
of the labour supply response implying a higher probability of adopting this response. The effect 
of commonality is positive for the remaining responses, implying that they are less likely to be 
adopted,  but  the  coefficient  is  only  significant  for  asset  sales.  The  signs  of  commonality 
coefficients are the same in the Poisson and threshold models as in the MLM case, but statistical 
significance is greater.  
·  The estimated models provide very clear evidence that the probability of responding to shocks 
through use of savings increases with permanent income (i.e. the cost of responding through the 
use of savings is significantly negatively related to permanent income)
5. 
                                                 
5 We ran the Poisson and threshold models with the full set of a coefficients. All apart from a5 (“use 
savings”)  were  close  to  zero.  Even  in  the  MLM  model  we  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  all  the 
coefficients on permanent income except a5 are equal to zero (c
2(5) = 3.81, tail probability 0.58).    13 
·  The average number of responses for the interviewer is highly significant for economic shocks, 
and fairly significant for demographic shocks irrespective of model specification confirming 
that interviewer identity plays an important role in determining the number of responses. 
These results are all in line with the qualitative conclusions drawn from Tables 1-3 in section 4. 
 
7.  Testing the model specification 
We have considered three models – the first (MLM) supposes independence of alternatives, the 
second (Poisson-multinomial) and the third (threshold multinomial) treat choices as dependent but 
not mutually exclusive. These models have allowed us to estimate the probabilities of choosing 
different alternative using both the MLM and the multinomial specification. The MLM and the 
multinomial  specifications  answer  two  different  questions  and  maximize  different  likelihood 
functions.  
 
The MLM model treats choices over different responses as independent. The likelihood is defined 
in terms of the probability of each response being selected. If household h selects response m to 
shock s, rhms = 1. This outcome occurs with probability phms. Similarly, the outcome and rhms.= 0 






1 ) 1 ( and  the  log-likelihood  is  ln (1 )ln(1 ) hms hms hms hms r p r p + - - .  The  overall  log-
likelihood function is  
[ ]
1 1 1
ln (1 )ln(1 )
H S M
hms hms hms hms
h s m
LB r p r p
= = =
= + - - ∑∑∑       (19) 
 
In the multinomial specification the likelihood function is maximized over the entire set of all the 
possible combinations of responses. The entire set possible combinations of up to three choices is 
given  by  Q  =  41  possibilities  and  we  index  these  by  q  such  that  { }
1 1 hs W = ,  …,  { }
6 6 hs W = , 
{ }
7 1,2 hs W =  …,  { }
11 1,6 hs W =  etc. Define  1 hqs r = %  if the combination 
q W is chosen, 0 otherwise, with 
q =  1,…,Q  and  let  hqs p %   and  1 hqs p - %   be  the  associated  probabilities.  The  log-likelihood  for  the 
Poisson and the threshold models is defined as: 
 
1 1 1
ln (1 )ln(1 )
Q H S
hqs hqs hqs hqs
h s q
LJ r p r p
= = =
  = + - -   ∑∑∑ % % % %         (20)  
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The MLM and multinomial likelihood functions are not directly comparable although either can be 
transformed  into  the  other.  Given  the  independent  choice  probabilities  phms  estimated  from  the 
MLM model, the corresponding multinomial probabilities 
q







= - Õ Õ %            (21) 
Equivalently, given the multinomial probabilities 
q
hs p %  we may compute the associated probabilities 
phms associated with each choice as  









= ÎW ∑ %     (22) 
where the function  ( ) 1 v  returns the value unity if v is true and zero if false. 
 
We use expressions (21) and (22) to calculate the multinomial (joint choice-based) likelihood based 
on the estimated MLM probabilities and the MLM (independent choice-based) probabilities for the 
two multinomial models.  Table 5 lists the maximized log-likelihoods on both bases for all three 
specifications. The two multinomial models have higher log-likelihoods irrespective of the choice 
basis. On the independent choice basis, the threshold-multinomial model slightly out-performs the 








  Marginal logit model 
  Poisson-multinomial 







The  table  records  the  results  maximized  log-likelihoods  from 
equations (19) for the three models considered .  
 
The three models we have considered are not nested and comparison of likelihoods is therefore at 
best a criterion for good fit and not a test. In what follows, we first use a version of the paired J test 
introduced by Davidson and Mackinnon (1981).
6  
 
Index  the  three  specifications  as  (b,p,t)  for  the  MLM,  Poisson-multinomial  and  threshold-
multinomial  models  respectively.  Write  the  estimated  individual  choice-based  probabilities  as 
                                                 
6 A “paired” non-nested test is a test between a pair of two hypotheses from a larger set of hypotheses 
(McAleer, 1995). Our test should be thought of as a J-type test rather than a pure J test since our models do 
not fall within the linear regression class.   15 
( ) , ,
j
hms p j b p t =   and  the  estimated  joint  choice-based  probabilities  as  ( ) , ,
j
hqs p j b p t = % . 
Construct the two sets of differences  
( ) ,
j j b
hms hms hms d p p j p t = - =          (23) 
To perform the J-type test we include these differences 
j
hms d additively in the augmented MLM 
model. The J test statistic for the MLM null against alternative j is the one-sided t statistic on the 
coefficient lj of the variable 
j
hms d .   
 
The procedure for testing the two multinomial models is identical. We construct the four set of 
differences
7  
( ) ( , ) ( , ),( , ),( , ),( , )
jk j k
hqs hqs hqs d p p j k p b t b p t t p = - = % % %       (24) 
Regarding model j as the null, we re-estimate the model including the difference 
jk
hqs d %  as an additive 
regressor. The J test statistic for null j against alternative k is the t statistic on the coefficient ljk. 
Monte Carlo evidence has established that J tests have a pronounced tendency to over-reject in 
finite samples – see McAleer and Pesaran (1986) and McAleer (1987). 
 
Table 6 
J Test Results 











Poisson-multinomial  1.20 




Threshold-multinomial  2.23 
[1.29%] 
2.58 
[0.50%]  - 
The  table  records  the  results  of  the  J  tests  for  each  pair  of  models.  The  test 
statistics are distributed as Student t. Tail probabilities are given in parentheses. 
The hypotheses tests are all one-sided so rejection of the null at the conventional 
95% level is appropriate if the tail probability is inferior to 5%.  The tests are 
calculated using equations (23) and (24).  
 
Test outcomes are listed in Table 6. At the 5% level, neither of the multinomial models rejects the 
MLM model whereas the two multinomial models reject each other with the threshold model also 
being rejected by the MLM model. These outcomes are not easy to reconcile with the likelihood 
values reported in Table 5. We note that the properties of the J-style test have not been established 
                                                 
7 In effect three since 
tp pt
hqs hqs d d = - % % .   16 
for nonlinear environments and it also seems possible that our sample, although large, is insufficient 
to give reliable results. 
 
We obtain clearer results from an alternative approach using a linear probability (LPM) framework. 
To test the MLM null, consider the six regressions 
  ( ) , , , ;
j k jk
hms j hms k hms hms r p p u j k b p t k j = d +d + = ¹   (25) 
If the MLM model (Hj say) is valid, we should find  1 j d =  and  0 k d = . Conversely, if hypothesis k 
(Hk)  is  valid  we  should  find  0 j d =   and  1 k d = .  Similarly,  in  the  multinomial  framework,  we 
consider the six regressions 
  ( ) , , , ;
j j k jk
hqs j hqs k hqs hqs r p p u j k b p t k j = d +d + = ¹ % % % %   (26) 
The tests have the same form. However, as is well-known, the LPM suffers from heteroscedasticity 
and so in all cases we use a heteroscedasticity-robust estimate of the variance-covariance matrix. 
 
Table 7 
Linear Probability Model Test Results 
Individual choice basis  b d   p d   t d   Hk versus Hj  Hj versus Hk 
Hj  Marginal logit model  0.398  0.603  1.21  0.53 
Hk   Poisson-multinomial  (1.03)  (1.55) 
- 
[29.9%]  [59.0%] 
Hj  Marginal logit model  0.315  0.692  1.77  0.42 
Hk   Threshold-multinomial  (0.86) 
- 
(1.88)  [17.0%]  [65.9%] 
Hj  Poisson-multinomial  0.334  0.672  0.83  0.24 
Hk   Threshold-multinomial 
- 
(0.64)  (1.29)  [43.7%]  [78.3%] 
Joint choice basis           
Hj  Poisson-multinomial  0.011  1.005  32.7  0.10 
Hk   Marginal logit model  (0.09)  (8.09) 
- 
[0.00%]  [90.8%] 
Hj  Threshold-multinomial  0.049  0.975  36.8  0.26 
Hk   Marginal logit model  (0.42) 
- 
(8.58)  [0.00%]  [77.0%] 
Hj  Poisson-multinomial  0.287  0.733  2.18  0.43 
Hk   Threshold-multinomial 
- 
(0.78)  (2.01)  [11.3%]  [65.0%] 
The table reports the results of the test based using the linear probability (LPM) framework, 
described  in  equations  (25)  and  (26).  Hypothesis  test  statistics  (column  4  and  5)  are 
heteroscedasticity-corrected  F  tests.  Heteroscedasticity-robust  t-statistics  are  in  “(.)” 
parentheses and tail probabilities in “[.]” parentheses. 
 
Results are reported in Table 7. The upper block of tests relates to the individual choice basis. The 
tests fail to discriminate between the alternative models even though the estimated coefficients give 
a greater weight to the Poisson and threshold probabilities than to those form the MLM model. By 
contrast, using the joint choice basis (Table 7, lower block) the two multinomial models decisively 
reject the MLM model. Although it remains true that neither multinomial model is able to reject the   17 
other, the estimated coefficients give a higher weight to the threshold model in line with the log-
likelihoods reported in Table 5. 
 
In summary, the test outcomes depend on the way the model is framed. If the question is, “Which 
response modes will be adopted?”, this motivates an individual choice approach. In this case, the 
standard  MLM  model  appears  adequate.  If,  instead,  the  question  is,  “How  will  households 
respond?”,  a  joint  choice  is  required.  In  this  second  context,  it  is  important  to  explicitly 
acknowledge  the  joint  nature  of  multiple  response  choices  and  the  MLM  model  is  clearly 
inadequate. The evidence is less decisive in relation to the choice between alternative multinomial 
specifications although there is some suggestion that the threshold-multinomial model is slightly 
superior to the Poisson-multinomial model. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
Multinomial choice models have traditionally focussed on exclusive choice. Survey design may 
however permit multiple responses. One possibility is to model such responses as MLM, but this 
ignores possible interdependence of responses and allows the possibility of null response. We have 
developed two models which generalize the McFadden’s now standard random utility framework to 
allow for the possibility of multiple response.  In the first of these models, the respondent first 
decides on the number  of responses and then chooses the  actual responses to maximize utility 
conditional on that prior choice. In the second, threshold, model, the two decisions are made jointly, 
with the agent choosing multiple responses if utility outcomes are sufficiently close. These models 
are  both  relatively  straightforward  from  a  computational  standpoint  provided  the  number  of 
responses selected remains small. 
 
We  apply  this  framework  to  modelling  the  responses  of  households  in  rural  Indonesia  to 
demographic and economic shocks. The survey design obliges respondents to nominate at least one 
response to any such shock. A minority of households nominate multiple responses. The incidence 
of multiple responses appears to be primarily a function of the identity of the interviewer, and it 
appears that interviewers may have interpreted the survey instructions differently. Both the Poisson 
and  threshold  multinomial  models  outperform  the  MLM  model.  Choice  between  the  two 
multinomial models is less clear but the data appear to marginally more favourable to the threshold 
model. 
   18 
There  are  also  substantive  conclusions.  Macroeconomic  theory  emphasizes  the  role  of  the 
individual  household’s  savings  as  a  device  for  smoothing  consumption  ion  the  face  of  income 
shocks. Our data for rural Indonesian households demonstrates the importance of this mechanism 
but only for the richest households. By contrast, the theoretical literature on shock response in 
development economics has emphasized the role of informal insurance arrangements at the family 
and  village  level  but  has  noted  that  these  arrangements  only  work  well  when  shocks  are 
idiosyncratic. We develop a measure of the commonality of shocks and show that response choice 
does indeed depend on commonality. This provides strong confirmation of the importance of these 
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     Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t 
k (demographic)             
extra job   2.81  6.91         
loan  0.93  2.51  -1.54  -6.89  -1.49  -6.75 
sell assets  1.13  2.99  -1.40  -6.05  -1.34  -5.89 
family assistance  1.17  3.04  -1.36  -5.56  -1.33  -5.46 
use savings  2.94  6.27  0.24  0.71  0.15  0.41 
cut expenses  3.41  7.53  0.64  1.83  0.62  1.82 
k (economic)             
extra job   1.54  5.46         
loan  2.05  6.88  0.40  2.13  0.34  1.92 
sell assets  2.05  6.73  0.38  1.93  0.34  1.83 
family assistance  3.22  8.91  1.40  5.10  1.28  4.84 
use savings  4.71  10.26  2.82  7.45  2.63  7.26 
cut expenses  1.94  7.09  0.31  1.78  0.24  1.44 
g  (commonality)             
extra job   -0.29  -4.18         
loan  0.08  1.17  0.27  3.32  0.26  3.40 
sell assets  0.20  2.22  0.37  4.04  0.36  4.06 
family assistance  0.12  0.97  0.31  2.53  0.31  2.63 
use savings  0.11  0.72  0.31  2.00  0.30  2.01 
cut expenses  0.01  0.15  0.20  2.72  0.19  2.79 
a  (permanent 
income) 
           
use savings  -0.55  -5.03  -0.52  -5.52  -0.47  -5.43 
b interviewer             
   demographic  -0.30  -1.05         
   economic  -0.69  -3.46         
m, t (intercept)             
   demographic      -2.84  -4.74  -3.00  -3.04 
   economic       -5.12  -10.05  -6.29  -9.27 
m,t  (interviewer)             
   demographic      1.09  2.31  1.56  1.90 
   economic      2.73  7.29  4.01  7.84 
log likelihood  -2125.7444  -2454.87  -2456.67 
The table reports the estimated parameters of the deterministic component of the cost function (13) 
using respectively the MLM, the Poisson-multinomial and the threshold multinomial models. In 
the Poisson and threshold models, parameters are normalized setting the adjustment cost ch1s to 
zero for each shock type s ( ( ) 1 1 1 0 1,.., s s s S k = g = a = = ). The estimated threshold  hs t and Poisson 
parameters  hs m  are also reported. 
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Appendix A – Income Equation Estimation 
We  adapt  the  methodology  used  by  Paxson  (1992)  and  Cameron  and  Worswick  (2003)  to 
decompose  household  income
8  into  permanent  and  transitory  components.  We  estimate  the 
following equation:  
0 1 2
P T
h h h h Y X X = a +a +a +n           (A1) 




h X  are variables viewed as determinants of 
permanent and the transitory income respectively. This allows us to decompose income as:
9  
0 1 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
P P T
h h Y X X = a +a +a           (A2) 
( ) 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ
T T T
h h h Y X X = a - +n           (A3) 
We use the following variables 
P
h X  to identify the permanent component: the number of household 
members in each age categories, the number of adult members (age 18-64) in each education/gender 
category, dummies variables that indicate the occupation of the household head,
10 a dummy that 
identifies if there is a householder who has a non-farm business, the value of land and provincial 
dummies. 
2
h X  includes dummy variables for the shocks experienced in the previous two years. 
There are two complications. First, not all shocks can be treated as transitory. For example, death of 
a  household  member  may  affect  income  in  a  permanent  way.  Hence,  deaths  occurred  in  the 
previous five years are included in the estimation of the permanent component. Second, households 
with  a  non-farm  business  are  more  likely  to  experience  a  household  or  business  loss  due  to  a 
disaster. This motivates the inclusion of an interaction term between the non-farm business dummy 
and the business loss variable in the vector. 
                                                 
8  Household  income  ( h Y )  is  calculated  as  the  sum  of  the  following  variables:  wages  earned  by  each 
household  member,  net  profit  generated  by  the  farm,  net  profit  generated  by  the  household  business, 
household income other than from business or employment (pension, scholarship loan, insurance claim, 
winnings,  gift  from  family  or  friends,  other),  total  income  from  household  assets  (other  that  farm  and 
business assets). 
9 We subtract the sample mean of the 
T
h X variables to ensure that transitory income has zero sample mean. 




Variable  Mean  s.d.  Min  Max 
Household income  1080  1598  - 104  20130 
Death  0.078  0.27  0  1 
Sickness  0.05  0.22  0  1 
Crop loss  0.105  0.306  0  1 
Business loss  0.011  0.103  0  1 
Business loss  x non farm business  0.006  0.078  0  1 
Unemployment  0.009  0.092  0  1 
Price falls  0.045  0.21  0  1 
Non-farm business  0.32  0.466  0  1 
Land value  3062  11077  0  200000 
# household members aged 0 to 5  0.65  0.81  0  5 
# household members aged 6 to 11  0.71  0.84  0  4 
# household members aged 12 to 17  0.64  0.83  0  5 
# household members aged 18 to 64  2.32  1.06  0  12 
# household members aged over 64  0.2  0.5  0  8 
# males 18-64 without education  0.17  0.4  0  3 
# females 18-64 without education  0.37  0.54  0  3 
# males 18-64 –  primary school only  0.63  0.65  0  5 
# females 18-64 –  primary school only  0.64  0.62  0  5 
# males 18-64 up to secondary school  0.29  0.55  0  4 
# females 18-64 up to secondary school  0.19  0.44  0  4 
# males 18-64 high school  0.025  0.17  0  3 
# females 18-64 high school  0.012  0.11  0  2 
Head employee  0.29  0.45  0  1 
Head self-employed  0.69  0.46  0  1 
Head family worker  0.016  0.12  0  1 
Sample size: 3246 
“Death”  refers  to  a  death  in  the  previous  five  years.  All  other  negative  shock 
variables refer to the two years 1992-93. Household income and land value are in 
thousand rupiahs. 
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Table A2 
Income decomposition equation estimates 
Dependent variable: Household income 
Permanent components   Coefficient  t 
Intercept  242.1  1.21 
Death  -267.32  -3.41 
Non-farm business  587  10.11 
Land value  0.021  4.17 
# household members aged 6 to 11  83  2.31 
# household members aged 12 to 17  97.73  2.95 
# household members aged over 64  -37.40  -0.57 
# males 18-64 up to secondary school  591.78  9 
# females 18-64 up to secondary school  570.48  5.72 
# males 18-64 high school  1737.66  6.23 
# females 18-64 high school  1913.4  4.63 
Head employee  736.84  4.5 
Transitory components  Coefficient  t 
Sickness  -52.54  -0.51 
Crop loss  -88.2  -1.21 
Business loss  340.17  0.98 
Business loss  x non farm business  -351.9  -0.76 
Unemployment  -424.54  -2.32 
Price falls  -57.82  -0.51 
 F31,3320     25.61 
 R
2    0.3172 
The table reports the OLS estimates from equation (A1). The 
household  income  is  regressed  on  a  set  of  variables  that 
determine  the  permanent  and  the  transitory  income 
components. “Non-farm business” is a dummy that is equal to 
one if the household owns a non farm business. The dummy 
“Head employee” refers to the work status of the household 
head. “Death” refers to a death in the previous five years. All 
other negative shock variables refer to the two years 1992-93. 
Only  the  principal  variables  that  enter  in  the  permanent 
income estimation are reported in the table. 
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 Appendix B – Calculation  of multinomial probabilities 
Poisson-multinomial model 
In the case in which mh = 2 with responses i and  j selected, we need to consider the probability that 
j is the overall cost minimizing choice and that i is the next best, and the converse situation in which 
i is the overall cost minimizing choice and that j is the next best. Hence, using the notation already 
established: 
{ } ( )
2
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
Pr , | 2, . .
1 1
.
hj hj hi hi
h h h hij M M M M
hm hm hm hj hm hi
m m m m
hi hj
M M M
hm hm hj hm hi
m m m
a a a a
i j m x p
a a a a a a
a a
a a a a a
= = = =
= = =
W = = = = +
   
- -    
   
 
 
  = +
     
- -      
     
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
   (B1) 
Combining equations (5) and (B1),  
{ } ( )
1 1 1
1 1
Pr , | .
hi hj h h
h h hij M M M
hm hm hj hm hi
m m m
a a
i j x p
a a a a a
= = =
 
  q m   W = = = +
     
- -      
      ∑ ∑ ∑
    (B2) 
The argument is similar in the case that three responses are selected. We obtain 
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Threshold Multinomial Model 
In the case of double responses, equation (11) gives the probability of choosing modes 1 and 2: 
  ( )
( )
12 1 2 1 1
2 1 2 2
Pr & , 3,...,
Pr & , 3,...,
h h h h h h hm h
h h h h h hm h
p c c c t c c t m M
c c c t c c t m M
= < £ + £ - =
+ £ £ + £ - =
       
Consider the first term in this expression. We may split this into two further components as  
 
) ,..., 2 , Pr( ) ,..., 2 , ) 1 ( Pr(
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1 2 1
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This is illustrated in terms of the distribution function of c2 for the case of M =3 in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution function of c2 
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The second component of equation (11) follows directly as 
c1  c1+t  c3 
F(c2) 
c2   26 
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Combining equations (B4) and (B5), we obtain 
( ) 1 2
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1 2 1 2
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  (B6) 
 
Generalization to the case in which three modes are chosen is yet more complicated. For notational 




123 1 2 3 1 1
2 1 3 2 2
3 1 2 3 3
Pr , & , 4,...,
Pr , & , 4,...,
Pr , & , 4,...,
h h h h h h h hm h
h h h h h h hm h
h h h h h h hm h
p c c c c t c c t m M
c c c c t c c t m M
c c c c t c c t m M
= < £ + £ - =
+ £ £ + £ - =
+ £ £ + £ - =
    (B7) 
As previously, we analyze the three components separately. Consider the first component: 
( ) 1 2 3 1 1 Pr , & , 4,..., h h h h h h hm h c c c c t c c t m M < £ + £ - =  
This probability depends on the values of both c2 and c3 which are taken as following independent 
and identical Gumbel distributions. 
 Hence 
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Using equation (6), we may write this joint probability as 
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  (B8) 
It follows that   27 
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